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MULTIPARTY NON-INTERACTIVE KEY EXCHANGE
AND MORE FROM ISOGENIES ON ELLIPTIC CURVES
DAN BONEH1, DARREN GLASS2, DANIEL KRASHEN3, KRISTIN LAUTER4, SHAHED SHARIF5,
ALICE SILVERBERG6, MEHDI TIBOUCHI7, AND MARK ZHANDRY8
Abstract. We describe a framework for constructing an efficient non-interactive key ex-
change (NIKE) protocol for n parties for any n ≥ 2. Our approach is based on the problem
of computing isogenies between isogenous elliptic curves, which is believed to be difficult.
We do not obtain a working protocol because of a missing step that is currently an open
mathematical problem. What we need to complete our protocol is an efficient algorithm
that takes as input an abelian variety presented as a product of isogenous elliptic curves,
and outputs an isomorphism invariant of the abelian variety.
Our framework builds a cryptographic invariant map, which is a new primitive closely
related to a cryptographic multilinear map, but whose range does not necessarily have a
group structure. Nevertheless, we show that a cryptographic invariant map can be used to
build several cryptographic primitives, including NIKE, that were previously constructed
from multilinear maps and indistinguishability obfuscation.
1. Introduction
Let Fq be a finite field, let E be an ordinary elliptic curve over Fq, and let X be the set of
elliptic curves over Fq that are isogenous to E. The set X is almost always large (containing
on the order of
√
q elements). Moreover, under suitable conditions on E, the set X is endowed
with a free and transitive action ∗ by a certain abelian group G, which is the ideal class group
of the endomorphism ring of E. The action ∗ maps a given g ∈ G and E ∈ X to a curve
g ∗E ∈ X.
This action, originally defined by Deuring [Deu41], has a number of properties that makes
it useful in cryptography. First, for a fixed curve E ∈ X, the map G → X defined by
g 7→ g ∗ E is believed to be a one-way function. In other words, given a random curve
E′ ∈ X it is difficult to find an element g ∈ G such that E′ = g ∗ E. This suggests a Diffie–
Hellman two-party key exchange protocol, proposed by Couveignes [Cou06] and Rostovtsev
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and Stolbunov [RS06]: Alice chooses a random a ∈ G and publishes Ea := a∗E; Bob chooses
a random b ∈ G and publishes Eb := b ∗ E. Their shared key is the curve
Eab := (ab) ∗ E = a ∗Eb = b ∗ Ea,
which they can both compute. To ensure that both parties obtain the same key, their shared
key is the j-invariant of the curve Eab. More recently, De Feo, Jao, and Pluˆt [FJP14], Gal-
braith [Gal18], Castryck et al. [CLM+18], and De Feo, Kieffer, and Smith [FKS18] proposed
variants of this protocol with better security and efficiency. Moreover, a supersingular version
of the isogeny problem was introduced and proposed as the basis for a collision resistant hash
function [CLG09]. Security of this one-way function was further studied in [EHL+18].
Second, as alluded to above, the star operator satisfies the following useful property: for
all g1, . . . , gn ∈ G the abelian varieties
A1 := (g1 ∗E)× · · · × (gn ∗ E) and A2 := (g1 · · · gn) ∗ E × En−1
are isomorphic (see Appendix A.4). As we will see in the next section, this suggests an n-party
non-interactive key exchange protocol, as well as many other cryptographic constructions.
This property leads to a more general cryptographic primitive that we call a cryptographic
invariant map, defined in the next section. This primitive has properties that are similar
to those of cryptographic multilinear maps [BS03, GGH13a], which have found numerous
applications in cryptography (e.g, [GGH+13b, GGSW13, BW13, BLR+15]). We discuss
applications of cryptographic invariant maps in Section 3. In Remark 4.4 we explain why
we use ordinary and not supersingular elliptic curves. Section 4 describes our approach to
constructing cryptographic invariant maps from isogenies.
This work leads to the following question in algebraic geometry.
An open problem. To make the cryptographic applications discussed above viable we must
first overcome an important technical challenge. While the varieties A1 and A2 defined above
are isomorphic, they are presented differently. Our applications require an efficient way
to compute an invariant that is the same for A1 and A2. In addition, the invariant must
distinguish non-isomorphic varieties. We do not know any such computable isomorphism
invariant, and we present this as an open problem. In Section 5 we explain why some natural
proposals for isomorphism invariants do not seem to work. In Remarks 2.4 and 4.2 we
show that a solution to this open problem, even for n = 2, would solve the isogeny decision
Diffie–Hellman problem. Further, we give evidence that computing a particular isomorphism
invariant might be equivalent to solving the elliptic curve isogeny problem, which is believed
(or hoped) to be a quantum-resistant hard problem. Thus, Section 5 might be useful from
the point of view of cryptanalysis of isogeny-based cryptography.
2. Cryptographic invariant maps
Definition 2.1. Let X be a finite set and let G be a finite abelian group. We say that G
acts efficiently on X freely and transitively if there is an efficiently computable map
∗ : G×X → X such that:
• the map is a group action: g ∗ (h ∗ x) = (gh) ∗ x, and there is an identity element
id ∈ G such that id ∗x = x, for all x ∈ X and all g, h ∈ G;
• the action is transitive: for every (x, y) ∈ X ×X there is a g ∈ G such that g ∗x = y;
and
• the action is free: if x ∈ X and g, h ∈ G satisfy g ∗ x = h ∗ x, then g = h.
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Definition 2.2. By a cryptographic invariant map we mean a randomized algorithm
MapGen that inputs a security parameter λ, outputs public parameters pp = (X,S,G, e),
and runs in time polynomial in λ, where:
• X and S are sets, and X is finite,
• G is a finite abelian group that acts efficiently on X freely and transitively,
• e is a deterministic algorithm that runs in time polynomial in λ and n, such that for
each n > 0, algorithm e takes λ as input and computes a map en : X
n → S that
satisfies:
– Invariance property of en: for all x ∈ X and g1, . . . , gn ∈ G,
en(g1 ∗ x, . . . , gn ∗ x) = en
(
(g1 · · · gn) ∗ x, x, . . . , x
)
;
– Non-degeneracy of en: for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n and x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn ∈
X, the map X → S defined by y 7→ en(x1, . . . , xi−1, y, xi+1, . . . , xn) is injective.
In our candidate instantiation for cryptographic invariant maps the set X is a set of
isogenous elliptic curves and the group G acting on X is a class group. The elements of S
are isomorphism invariants of products of elliptic curves.
Definition 2.2 is quite ambitious in that it asks that en be defined for all n > 0 and run
in polynomial time in n (and λ). A cryptographic invariant map that is defined even for
a single n > 2, and satisfies the security assumptions in the next subsection, would still be
quite interesting. We require a construction that works for all n because our framework using
elliptic curve isogenies seems to support it. Similarly, we note that a construction that works
for all n > 0, but runs in time exponential in n is still useful. It would limit our ability to
evaluate en to relatively small n, but that is still of great interest. In the first three proposals
in Section 5 we study candidates for en that run in time exponential in n, satisfy the non-
degeneracy property, but do not satisfy the invariance property. It is an open problem to
find a map that also satisfies the invariance property.
Security assumptions. Next, we define some security assumptions on cryptographic in-
variant maps. The notation x ←R X will denote an independent uniform random variable x
over the set X. Similarly, we use x′ ←R A(y) to define a random variable x′ that is the output
of a randomized algorithm A on input y.
The n-way computational Diffie–Hellman assumption states that, given only the public
parameters and (g1∗x, . . . , gn∗x) ∈ Xn, it is difficult to compute en−1
(
(g1 · · · gn)∗x, x, . . . , x
)
.
A precise definition is the following:
Definition 2.3. We say that MapGen satisfies the n-way computational Diffie–Hellman
assumption (n-CDH) if for every polynomial time algorithm A,
Pr
[
A(pp, g1 ∗ x, . . . , gn ∗ x) = en−1
(
(g1 · · · gn) ∗ x, x, . . . , x
)]
is a negligible function of λ, when pp←R MapGen(λ), g1, . . . , gn ←R G, and x←R X.
Remark 2.4. The natural n-way decision Diffie–Hellman assumption on X does not hold
when invariant maps exist. That is, for all n > 0 it is easy to distinguish (g1 · · · gn) ∗ x ∈ X
from a random element of X, given only x, g1 ∗x, . . . , gn ∗x. Given a challenge y ∈ X, simply
check if
en(y, x, . . . , x) = en(g1 ∗ x, . . . , gn ∗ x).
Equality holds if and only if y = (g1 · · · gn) ∗ x. However, in Definition 2.5 we define an
n-way decision Diffie–Hellman assumption for en−1. It states that it is hard to distinguish
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en−1
(
(g1 · · · gn) ∗ x, x, . . . , x
)
from a random element in the image of en−1, given only the
public parameters, x, and (g1 ∗ x, . . . , gn ∗ x) ∈ Xn.
Definition 2.5. We say that MapGen satisfies the n-way decision Diffie–Hellman as-
sumption (n-DDH) if the following two distributions, P0 and P1, are polynomially indis-
tinguishable, when pp←R MapGen(λ), g1, . . . , gn ←R G, and x←R X:
• P0 is (pp, g1 ∗ x, . . . , gn ∗ x, s0) where s0 = en−1
(
(g1 · · · gn) ∗ x, x, . . . , x
)
,
• P1 is (pp, g1 ∗ x, . . . , gn ∗ x, s1) where s1 is random in Im(en−1) ⊆ S.
3. Applications
We show that suitable cryptographic invariant maps can be used to solve a number of
important problems in cryptography.
n-way Non-Interactive Key Exchange (NIKE). We show how to use a cryptographic
invariant map to construct a Non-Interactive Key Exchange (NIKE) protocol in which n par-
ties create a shared secret key that only they can efficiently calculate, without any interaction
among the n parties. Currently, secure n-party NIKE for n > 3 is only known from general
purpose indistinguishability obfuscation (e.g., [BZ17]). Our NIKE construction is similar to
the one in [Jou04, BS03, GGH13a] and satisfies a “static” notion of security.
• Setup(λ): run (X,S,G, e) ←R MapGen(λ) and choose x←R X. Output pp := (X,S,G, e, x).
• For i = 1, . . . , n, party i chooses a random gi ←R G, computes xi := gi ∗ x ∈ X, and
publishes xi on a public bulletin board.
• The shared key between the n-parties is
k := en−1
(
(g1 · · · gn) ∗ x, x, . . . , x
) ∈ S.
Party i ∈ {1, . . . , n} computes k by obtaining x1, . . . , xn from the bulletin board, then
choosing some j ∈ {1, . . . , n} where j 6= i, and computing
k = en−1(x1, . . . , xj−1, gi ∗ xj, xj+1, . . . , xn) ∈ S,
where xi is omitted from the input to en−1.
All n parties obtain the same key k by the invariance property of en−1. Static security
follows from the n-way decision Diffie–Hellman assumption, as in [BS03]. Alternatively, we
can rely on the weaker n-way computational Diffie–Hellman assumption by applying a hash
function H : S → K to the key k. We model H as a random oracle in the security analysis.
We leave the question of an adaptively-secure NIKE, in the sense of [FHKP13, Rao14], from
an invariant map for future work.
Unique signatures and verifiable random functions (VRF). A digital signature scheme
is made up of three algorithms: a key generation algorithm that outputs a public key and a
secret key, a signing algorithm that signs a given message using the secret key, and a verifica-
tion algorithm that verifies a signature on a given message using the public key. A signature
scheme is a unique signature scheme if for every public key and every message, there is
at most one signature that will be accepted as a valid signature for that message under the
public key. While a number of unique signature schemes are known in the random oracle
model (e.g., [BR96, BLS01]), it is quite hard to construct unique signatures without random
oracles [Lys02, DY05]. Unique signatures are closely related to a simpler object called a
verifiable random function, or VRF [MRV99]. Previous results show how to construct unique
signatures and VRFs from multilinear maps without random oracles [BS03]. The same con-
structions work with a cryptographic invariant map. The unique signature scheme works
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as follows: The secret key is a random (g1,0, g1,1, . . . , gn,0, gn,1) ←R G2n. The public key is
(x, y1,0, . . . , yn,1) ∈ X2n+1 where x ←R X and yi,b := gi,b ∗ x for i = 1, . . . , n and b = 0, 1.
The signature on an n-bit message m ∈ {0, 1}n is σ := (∏ni=1 gi,mi) ∗ x ∈ X. To verify a
signature σ, check that en(σ, x, . . . , x) = en
(
y1,m1 , . . . , yn,mn
)
. The security analysis of this
construction is the same as in [BS03].
Constrained PRFs and broadcast encryption. We next describe how to construct con-
strained pseudorandom functions [BW13, KPTZ13, BGI14] for bit-fixing constraints from a
cryptographic invariant map. Such constrained PRFs in turn can be used to build broadcast
encryption with short ciphertexts [BW13].
A pseudorandom function (PRF) is a function F : K × A → B that is computable in
polynomial time. Here, K is the key space, A is the domain, and B is the codomain. Intu-
itively, PRF security requires that, for a random key k ∈ K, an adversary who obtains pairs(
a, F (k, a)
)
, for a ∈ A of its choice, cannot distinguish these pairs from pairs (a, f(a)) where
f is a random function A → B.
A bit-fixing constrained PRF is a PRF where a key k ∈ K can be constrained to only
evaluate the PRF on a subset of the domain A, where A = {0, 1}n. Specifically, for V ⊆
[n] = {1, . . . , n} and a function v : V → {0, 1}, let Av = {a ∈ A : ∀i ∈ V, ai = v(i)}. A
constrained key kv enables one to evaluate F (k, a) for all a ∈ Av, but reveals nothing about
F (k, a) for a /∈ Av. We refer to [BW13] for the complete definition of this concept, and its
many applications.
We now explain how to construct bit-fixing constrained PRFs from cryptographic invari-
ant maps. The construction and security proof are essentially the same as in Boneh and
Waters [BW13], but translated to our setting. One complication is that the construction
of Boneh and Waters requires a way to operate on invariants in S. We get around this by
delaying the evaluation of the invariant to the very last step. We thus obtain the following
bit-fixing constrained PRF:
• Setup(λ): run (X,S,G, e) ←R MapGen(λ) and choose x←R X.
Next choose α←R G and di,b ←R G for i ∈ [n] and b ∈ {0, 1}.
Output the key k = (X,S,G, e, α, {di,b}i,b).
• The PRF is defined as: F (k, a) = en
(
(α×∏ni=1 di,ai) ∗ x, x, . . . , x).
Here, a ∈ {0, 1}n specifies a subset product of the set of di,b’s.
• Constrain(k, v): Let V ⊆ [n] be the support of the function v, and assume V is not
empty. The constrained key kv is constructed as follows. Set Di,b = di,b ∗x for i /∈ V .
Let i0 be the smallest element of V . Choose |V | − 1 random gi ∈ G for i ∈ V \ {i0},
and set gi0 = α×
∏
i∈V di,vi × (
∏
i∈V \{i0}
gi)
−1 ∈ G. Let hi = gi ∗ x for i ∈ V .
The constrained key is kv =
({Di,b}i/∈V,b∈{0,1}, {hi}i∈V ).
• Eval(kv , a): To evaluate F (k, a) using the constrained key kv do the following. If
a /∈ Av, output ⋄. Otherwise, for i = 1, . . . , n, let Ci = Di,ai if i /∈ V , and let Ci = hi
otherwise. Output en(C1, . . . , Cn). Then, by construction,
en(C1, . . . , Cn) = en
((∏
i/∈V
di,ai
∏
i∈V
gi
)
∗ x, x, . . . , x
)
= F (k, a),
as required.
The security proof for this construction is as in [BW13]. This construction can be further
extended to a verifiable random function (VRF) by adapting Fuchsbauer [Fuc14] in a similar
fashion.
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Witness encryption. Witness encryption, due to Garg et al. [GGSW13], can be used to
construct Identity-Based Encryption, Attribute-Based Encryption, broadcast encryption [Zha16],
and secret sharing for NP statements. Witness encryption is a form of encryption where a
public key is simply an NP statement, and a secret key is a witness for that statement. More
precisely, a witness encryption scheme is a pair of algorithms:
• Enc(x,m) is a randomized polynomial-time algorithm that takes as input an NP
statement x and a message m, and outputs a ciphertext c;
• Dec(x,w, c) is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that takes as input a state-
ment x, supposed witness w, and ciphertext c, and attempts to produce the message
m.
We require that if w is a valid witness for x, then for any message m, if c←R Enc(x,m), then
Dec(x,w, c) outputs m with probability 1.
The basic notion of security for witness encryption is soundness security, which requires
that if x is false, then Enc(x,m) hides all information about m. A stronger notion called
extractable security, due to Goldwasser et al. [GKP+13], requires, informally, that if one can
learn any information about m from Enc(x,m), then it must be the case that one “knows” a
witness for x.
We briefly describe how to construct witness encryption from invariant maps. It suf-
fices to give a construction from any NP-complete problem. There are at least two natural
constructions from multilinear maps that we can use. One approach is to adapt the original
witness encryption scheme of Garg et al. [GGSW13] based on the Exact Cover problem. This
approach unfortunately also requires the same graded structure as needed by Boneh and Wa-
ters [BW13]. However, we can apply the same ideas as in our constrained PRF construction
to get their scheme to work with invariant maps. Another is the scheme of Zhandry [Zha16]
based on Subset Sum.1
As with the constructions of Garg et al. and Zhandry, the security of these constructions
can be justified in an idealized attack model for the cryptographic invariant map, allowing
only the operations explicitly allowed by the map—namely the group action and the map
operation. Justification in idealized models is not a proof, but provides heuristic evidence for
security.
4. Cryptographic invariant maps from isogenies
We begin by recalling some facts that are presented in more detail in Appendix A. Let E
be an ordinary elliptic curve over a finite field Fq such that the ring Z[π] generated by its
Frobenius endomorphism π is integrally closed. This implies in particular that Z[π] is the
full endomorphism ring O of E. Let Cl(O) denote the ideal class group of this ring, and let
Ell(O) denote the isogeny class of E. There exists a free and transitive action ∗ of Cl(O) on
Ell(O), and there is a way to represent elements of Cl(O) (namely, as products of prime ideals
of small norm) that makes this action efficiently computable. Moreover, one can efficiently
sample close to uniform elements in Cl(O) under that representation. In addition, the “star
operator” ∗ satisfies the following property: for any choice of ideal classes a1, . . . , an, a′1, . . . , a′n
in Cl(O), the abelian varieties
(1) (a1 ∗E)× · · · × (an ∗ E) and (a′1 ∗E)× · · · × (a′n ∗ E)
1The basic scheme shown by Zhandry requires an “asymmetric” multilinear map, where the inputs to the
map come from different sets. However, he also explains how to instantiate the scheme using symmetric
multilinear maps. The symmetric scheme easily translates to use invariant maps.
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are isomorphic over Fq if and only if a1 · · · an = a′1 · · · a′n in Cl(O). In particular:
(2) (a1 ∗ E)× · · · × (an ∗E) ∼= (a1 · · · an) ∗E × En−1.
Denote by Ab(E) the set of abelian varieties over Fq that are a product of the form (2),
and assume that we can efficiently compute an isomorphism invariant for abelian varieties in
Ab(E). In other words, assume that we have an efficiently computable map isom: Ab(E)→
S to some set S that to any tuple E1, . . . , En of elliptic curves isogenous to E associates an
element isom(E1× · · ·×En) of S such that isom(E1× · · ·×En) = isom(E′1× · · ·×E′n) if and
only if the products E1×· · ·×En and E′1×· · · ×E′n are isomorphic as abelian varieties. The
curves Ei are given for example by their j-invariants, and in particular, the ideal classes ai
such that Ei ∼= ai ∗ E are not supposed to be known.
Based on such an isomorphism invariant isom, we construct a cryptographic invariant map
as follows. The algorithm MapGen(λ) computes a sufficiently large base field Fq, and an
elliptic curve E over Fq such that the ring Z[π] generated by its Frobenius endomorphism is
integrally closed (this can be done efficiently: see again Appendix A). The algorithm then
outputs the public parameters pp = (X,S,G, e) where:
• X = Ell(O) is the isogeny class of E over Fq;
• S is the codomain of the isomorphism invariant isom;
• G = Cl(O) is the ideal class group of O; and
• the map en : Xn → S is given by en(E1, . . . , En) = isom(E1 × · · · × En).
The facts recalled at the beginning of this section show that G acts efficiently on X freely
and transitively in the sense of Definition 2.1, and that the properties of Definition 2.2 are
satisfied. In particular, the invariance property follows from (2), and the non-degeneracy from
the fact that the abelian varieties in (1) are isomorphic only if the corresponding products
of ideal classes coincide. Thus, this approach does provide a cryptographic invariant map
assuming isom exists.
Remark 4.1. In the 2-party case, the NIKE protocol obtained from this construction coincides
with the isogeny key exchange protocols over ordinary curves described by Couveignes [Cou06]
and Rostovtsev–Stolbunov [RS06].
Remark 4.2. The existence of isom breaks the isogeny decision Diffie–Hellman problem. In-
deed, given three elliptic curves (a ∗ E, b ∗ E, c ∗ E) isogenous to E, one can check whether
c = ab in Cl(O) by testing whether the surfaces
(a ∗ E)× (b ∗ E) and (c ∗ E)× E
are isomorphic. This does not prevent the construction of secure NIKE protocols (as those can
be based on the computational isogeny Diffie–Hellman problem by applying a hash function:
see Section 3), but currently, no efficient algorithm is known for this isogeny decision Diffie–
Hellman problem.
Remark 4.3. For certain applications, it would be interesting to be able to hash to the set
X = Ell(O), i.e., construct a random-looking curve E′ in the isogeny class of E without
knowing an isogeny walk from E to E′. An equivalent problem is to construct a random-
looking elliptic curve with exactly #E(Fq) points over Fq. This seems difficult, however; the
normal way of doing so involves the CM method, which is not efficient when the discriminant
is large.
Remark 4.4. One can ask whether this construction extends to the supersingular case. Over
Fp2 with p prime, the answer is clearly no, as the isogeny class of a supersingular elliptic curve
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is not endowed with a natural free and transitive group action by an abelian group. More
importantly, isomorphism classes of products of isogenous supersingular elliptic curves over Fq
are essentially trivial at least in a geometric sense. Indeed, according to a result of Deligne (see
[Shi78, Theorem 3.5]), if E1, . . . , En, E
′
1, . . . , E
′
n are all isogenous to a supersingular elliptic
curve E, then
E1 × · · · × En ∼= E′1 × · · · × E′n over Fq
as soon as n ≥ 2. In fact, the result holds over any extension of the base field over which
all the endomorphisms of E are defined, so already over Fp2 . However, for a supersingular
elliptic curve E over a prime field Fp, the number of Fp-isomorphism classes of products
E1 × · · · × En with all Ei isogenous to E can be large. For example, this is shown when
n = 2 in [XYY16, Section 5]. Therefore, one could conceivably obtain a “commutative
supersingular” version of the construction above, which would generalize the recent 2-party
key exchange protocol CSIDH [CLM+18], assuming that Fp-isomorphism invariants can be
computed in that setting. Since those invariants must be arithmetic rather than geometric
in nature, however, this seems even more difficult to achieve than in the ordinary case.
5. Some natural candidate cryptographic invariant maps
In order to instantiate a cryptosystem based on the ideas in this paper, it remains to
find an efficiently computable map isom: Ab(E) → S for some set S, as in the previous
section. Below we give evidence that several natural candidates fail, either because efficiently
computing them would break the cryptographic security, or because they are not in fact
isomorphism invariants.
Our primary roadblock is that while E1 × · · · × En and E′1 × · · · × E′n can be isomorphic
as unpolarized abelian varieties, they are not necessarily isomorphic as polarized abelian
varieties with their product polarizations. The first three proposals below for invariants are
invariants of the isomorphism class as polarized abelian varieties, but are not invariants of the
isomorphism class as unpolarized abelian varieties. We do not know a way for the different
parties to choose polarizations on their product varieties in a compatible way, to produce the
same invariant, without solving the elliptic curve isogeny problem.
At present, we do not know an invariant of abelian varieties in dimension ≥ 2 that does not
require choosing a polarization, with the exception of what we call the “Deligne invariant”,
described below.
The theta null invariant. One natural candidate is given by Mumford’s theta nulls, pre-
sented in detail in Appendix B. Unfortunately, in order to compute even a single theta null,
one must first choose a principal polarization, and the resulting invariant does depend on
this choice of polarization in a crucial way. In Proposition B.7 below we show that, as a
result, the theta nulls do not in fact provide an isomorphism invariant as unpolarized abelian
varieties.
Igusa invariants. Suppose n = 2 and EndE ⊗ Q ∼= Q(
√−d) with d ∈ N square-free. If
d 6= 1, 3, 7, 15, then for E1 and E2 in the isogeny class of E, the product E1 × E2 is the
Jacobian of a genus 2 curve C (see [HN65]). It is possible to compute such a genus 2 curve C,
given a suitable principal polarization on E1×E2. For each such C, one could then compute
the Igusa invariants [Igu60] of C. The number of genus 2 curves C such that E1 × E2 is
isomorphic to the Jacobian variety of C is large ([Hay65] and [Lan06, Theorem 5.1]), and
unfortunately the Igusa invariants are different for different choices of C. There are many
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principal polarizations on each element of Ab(E), and no compatible way for the different
parties to choose the same one.
Invariants of Kummer surfaces. When n = 2, another approach is to consider the Kum-
mer surface of A = E1 × E2, which is the quotient K = A/{±1}. The surface K itself does
not depend on a polarization. But extracting an invariant from K, for example as in [CF96,
Chapter 3], does depend on having a projective embedding of K.
Deligne invariant. A natural candidate is an isomorphism invariant studied by Deligne
[Del69]. Suppose A is an ordinary abelian variety over k = Fq. The Serre-Tate canonical lift
of A to characteristic 0 produces an abelian variety over the ring of Witt vectorsW (k¯). Fixing
an embedding α of W (k¯) into C, we can view this lift as a complex abelian variety A(α). Let
Tα(A) denote the first integral homology group of A
(α). The Frobenius endomorphism F of
A also lifts to characteristic 0 and defines an action of F on Tα(A). The theorem in [Del69,
§7] shows that ordinary abelian varieties A and B over Fq are isomorphic if and only if there
is an isomorphism Tα(A)→ Tα(B) that respects the action of F .
A natural candidate for a cryptographic invariant map is the map that sends (E1, . . . , En)
to the isomorphism invariant
Tα(E1 × · · · × En) = Tα(E1)⊕ · · · ⊕ Tα(En).
Specifying the isomorphism class of Tα(E1 × · · · × En) as a Z[F ]-module is equivalent to
specifying the action of F as a 2n × 2n integer matrix, unique up to conjugacy over Z.
However, we show in Theorem 5.1 below that being able to compute Tα(E) for an elliptic
curve E in polynomial time would yield a polynomial-time algorithm to solve the elliptic
curve isogeny problem of recovering a given E and a ∗ E, and conversely.
Theorem 5.1. An efficient algorithm to compute Deligne invariants Tα(E) on an isogeny
class of ordinary elliptic curves over a finite field k gives an efficient algorithm to solve the
elliptic curve isogeny problem in that isogeny class. Conversely, an efficient algorithm to
solve the elliptic curve isogeny problem on an isogeny class of ordinary elliptic curves over
k yields an efficient algorithm to compute, for some embedding α : W (k¯) →֒ C, the Deligne
invariants Tα(E) on the isogeny class.
Proof. Suppose that E1 and E2 are in the isogeny class, and suppose that for i = 1, 2 we have
a Z-basis {ui, vi} for Tα(Ei) and a 2 × 2 integer matrix giving the action of F with respect
to this basis. We will efficiently compute a fractional ideal a such that a ∗ E1 ∼= E2.
Let f(t) be the characteristic polynomial of Frobenius acting on E1 or E2; these are the
same since E1 and E2 are isogenous. Let R = Z[t]/(f) and RQ = R⊗Z Q. Then Tα(Ei) is a
rank one R-module, with t acting as F . Compute ai, bi ∈ Z such that F (ui) = aiui+bivi. Let
ai be the fractional R-ideal generated by 1 and (t− ai)/bi. Compute and output a = a1a−12 .
We claim that a ∗ E1 ∼= E2. Define λi : Tα(Ei) →֒ RQ by sending w ∈ Tα(Ei) to the
unique λi(w) ∈ RQ such that λi(w) · ui = w. Then λi(ui) = 1 and λi(vi) = (t − ai)/bi, so
the fractional ideal ai is the image of the map λi. Suppose M is a positive integer such that
Ma is an integral ideal of R, and let h = λ−12 ◦Mλ1. Then h(Tα(E1)) is an R-submodule
of Tα(E2). By [Del69, §7], the map E 7→ Tα(E) is a fully faithful functor, i.e., it induces a
bijection
Homk(E1, E2)→ HomR(Tα(E1), Tα(E2)).
Thus h arises from a unique isogeny φ : E1 → E2. By [Del69, §4], the kernel of φ is isomorphic
as an R-module to Tα(E2)/h(Tα(E1)). The latter R-module is isomorphic to R/Ma, and
hence is exactly annihilated byMa. Thus ker(φ) ∼= E1[Ma], so E2 ∼= E1/E1[Ma] ∼= (Ma)∗E1.
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SinceMa and a are in the same ideal class, we have E2 ∼= a∗E1, as desired. Fractional ideals
can be inverted in polynomial time by [Bel04, Algorithm 5.3] or [Coh93, §4.8.4] (see [Bel04,
p. 21] for the complexity).
Conversely, suppose we have an algorithm that efficiently solves the isogeny problem in
the isogeny class of an ordinary elliptic curve E0. Take R as above. We show below that
there exists an embedding α : W (k¯) →֒ C such that Tα(E0) ∼= R. Given E isogenous to E0,
use the isogeny problem algorithm to compute a such that E0 ∼= a ∗E. Output Tα(E) = a.
It remains to show that an embedding α : W (k¯) →֒ C exists such that Tα(E0) ∼= R and
Tα(E) = a. We follow an argument in the proof of [DT02, Theorem 2.1]. There exists an
elliptic curve E′ over C with CM by R for which H1(E
′,Z) ∼= R as R-modules. Take any
embedding β : W (k¯) →֒ C. Then the complex elliptic curve E(β) has CM by R, and by the
theory of complex multiplication there exists σ ∈ Gal(C/Q) such that E′ = σ(E(β)) = E(σ◦β).
Let α = σ ◦ β. By construction, Tα(E0) = H1(E′,Z) ∼= R. Further, by [Sil94, Prop. II.1.2],
Tα(E) ∼= a⊗R Tα(E0) ∼= a, as claimed. 
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Appendix A. Background on isogenies
This appendix provides background on isogenies of ordinary elliptic curves over finite fields
and their products, which expands upon the short discussion at the beginning of Section 4
and makes it explicit. Throughout this appendix, E is a fixed ordinary elliptic curve over the
finite field Fq.
A.1. Endomorphism rings. Let O = End(E) be the endomorphism ring of the elliptic
curve E. Note that since, in the ordinary case, all endomorphisms over the algebraic closure
are already defined over Fq, it is not necessary to distinguish between the endomorphisms of
E defined over Fq or over Fq.
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Denote by π ∈ O the Frobenius endomorphism of E, and by OK the integral closure of O,
i.e., the ring of integers of End(E)⊗ZQ. We have an inclusion of orders Z[π] ⊂ O ⊂ OK and
both inclusions are strict in general.
However, the conductor m =
[
OK : Z[π]
]
is typically quite small. Let t be the trace of
the Frobenius π (computed using Schoof’s algorithm) and Dπ = t
2 − 4p the discriminant
of Z[π]; then m is given by Dπ = m
2D where D is the (fundamental) discriminant of OK .
Hence, m2 is the quotient of Dπ by its squarefree part (or 4 times its squarefree part when
Dπ is even). This is usually a small number, and equal to 1 with constant probability for a
randomly chosen curve E.
Therefore, we will assume for simplicity that m = 1, and thus Z[π] = O = OK . Note
that strictly speaking, it is not known how to test for that condition in polynomial time
(squarefreeness is not known to be easier than factoring), but we can easily test for stronger
conditions, such as Dπ being prime or the product of a large prime by a small squarefree
integer, and since restricting attention to such special discriminants is desirable anyway (to
avoid smooth class numbers), this is a reasonable test to carry out.
In principle, it should be possible to extend what follows to the general case of an arbitrary
endomorphism ring O as long as we restrict attention to, on the one hand, the subset Ell(O)
of the isogeny class of E over Fq consisting of curves with the same endomorphism ring
O as E, and on the other hand, isogenies of degree prime to m. In particular, the latter
are guaranteed to preserve the endomorphism ring, and suffice to apply the expander graph
argument of Jao–Miller–Venkatesan [JMV09]; see below. There are a few complications
in considering the general case, however, so the extension is not considered in the present
discussion.
A.2. Classification of abelian varieties isogenous to a power of E. Let Ab(E) denote
the category of abelian varieties over Fq isogenous
2 to a product of copies of E. In the
case when Z[π] = OK = O, the functor Hom(E,−) is an equivalence between the category
Ab(E) and the category Mod(O) of torsion-free O-modules of finite type. The inverse functor
associates to any module M ∈ Mod(O) with finite presentation On → Om → M → 0 the
abelian varietyM⊗OE defined by taking the corresponding cokernel En → Em →M⊗OE →
0. This is established in Serre’s appendix [Ser02] to [Lau02]. See also [Kan11] and [JKP+18]
for more general related results.
In dimension 1, this implies that the set Ell(O) of isomorphism classes of elliptic curves
over Fq isogenous to E is in bijection with the set of isomorphism classes of torsion-free
modules of rank 1 over O. Since any such module is isomorphic to an ideal of O, this yields
a bijection between Ell(O) and the ideal class group Cl(O) of O.
Under that correspondence, an ideal a maps to the elliptic curve a⊗O E given by E/E[a],
where E[a] is the intersection of the kernels of all endomorphisms in a (that notation is
consistent with the usual one for torsion subgroups). Denote that elliptic curve by a ∗ E.
Its endomorphism ring is clearly still O, and the identification is canonical (e.g., because
the Frobenius endomorphism on each curve is well-defined). We can therefore consider the
elliptic curve b ∗ (a ∗ E) for some other ideal b of O, and it turns out to be isomorphic to
ab ∗ E. Thus, ∗ endows Ell(O) with a group action by Cl(O), under which it is a principal
homogenous space.
By Steinitz’s classification theorem of torsion-free modules of finite type over Dedekind
domains [Ste11] (which says that any such module is isomorphic to a sum of ideals, with
2The isogeny can be defined over Fq or the algebraic closure; the two notions coincide.
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equality when the product ideals are in the same class) and the equivalence of categories, we
see that any abelian variety A ∈ Ab(E) is of the form E1 × · · · × Eg for some elliptic curves
Ei of the form ai ∗ E. Moreover, two such abelian varieties,
A = E1 × · · · × Eg (Ei = ai ∗E) and
A′ = E′1 × · · · × E′g (E′i = a′i ∗ E),
are isomorphic if and only if [a1 · · · ag] = [a′1 · · · a′g] in Cl(O). In particular, for any fixed g ≥ 1,
the isomorphism classes of abelian varieties of dimension g are in bijection with Cl(O), given
by mapping [a] ∈ Cl(O) to (a ∗E)× Eg−1.
A.3. Random sampling and isogeny walks. The group Cl(O) is usually large; by Dirich-
let’s class number formula combined with Littlewood’s estimate for the values at 1 of the
L-functions of quadratic characters [Lit28], its order h(D) satisfies
h(D)≫
√
|D|
log log |D|
if one assumes that the Generalized Riemann Hypothesis holds for quadratic fields (where
D = t2− 4q can be chosen of the same order of magnitude as q in absolute value). Moreover,
the best known algorithms to compute its structure or even its order are subexponential.
We would therefore like to be able to sample uniformly from Cl(O) without having to
compute the group structure or the order, and do so in such a way that if the sampling
algorithm returns the class of an ideal a, it is feasible to compute a ∗ E (which cannot be
done directly with an ideal of large norm, as it involves computing a large degree isogeny).
To solve this problem, the same approach as in the supersingular case basically works:
simply obtain an element of the class group as a product of sufficiently many ideals of small
prime norm (and the corresponding isogeny as the composition of the corresponding isogenies
of small prime degrees). Contrary to the supersingular case, it is not possible to use a fixed
degree, but using all small primes up to a polynomial bound is enough, as we will discuss
below.
Prime ideals and ℓ-isogenies. Before we discuss the sampling of random classes in Cl(O),
we must recall a few facts about the ideals of the quadratic ring O and the corresponding
isogenies. All of this is described in particular in [Cou06], for example. Any ideal a of O can
be factored uniquely a = le11 · · · lerr into a product of powers of prime ideals li. To any prime
ideal l, one can associate the unique rational prime ℓ ∈ Z+ above which it sits (ℓ is such that
l ∩ Z = ℓZ), and prime ideals can thus be obtained from the ideal decomposition in O of
principal ideals generated by rational primes ℓ.
Since O is quadratic, that decomposition is easy to describe in terms of the Legendre
symbol
(
D
ℓ
)
. A rational prime ℓ such that
(
D
ℓ
)
= −1 is inert in O, i.e., ℓO is itself prime. As
a result, these prime ideals are trivial in the class group, and not interesting for our purposes.
On the other hand, a rational prime ℓ such that
(
D
ℓ
)
= 1 is completely split: we have ℓO = l· l¯
for distinct prime ideals l 6= l¯ of norm ℓ. This case is the most relevant for us; it gives rise to
ℓ-isogenies.
Finally, there are finitely many rational primes ℓ such that
(
D
ℓ
)
= 0, i.e., primes dividing
the discriminant. Those primes are ramified: ℓO = l2 for some prime ideal of norm ℓ. As a
result, a ramified prime l is of order at most 2 in the class group; moreover, it is a consequence
of the Chinese remainder theorem that one can always find an ideal a of O coprime to D
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such that [l] = [a] in Cl(O). Thus, we can always ignore these primes in order to make the
presentation more consistent.
It results from the above that any ideal class [a] ∈ Cl(O) can be written as a product
[l1]
e1 · · · [lr]er of powers of classes of prime ideals over split rational primes ℓi (such that(
D
ℓi
)
= 1). Computing a∗E therefore reduces to computing l∗C for an arbitrary prime ideal
l over a split rational prime ℓ, and C an arbitrary elliptic curve isogenous to E. This still
cannot be done when the norm ℓ is large, but if it is small (say polylog(q)), it can be done
efficiently.
Indeed, for such a split ℓ, there are exactly two ℓ-isogenies from C: if we let ℓO = l · l¯, these
are C → C/C[l] and C → C/C [¯l]. As usual for low degree isogenies, they can be computed
efficiently by evaluating modular polynomials. Moreover, we can easily distinguish between
the two by looking at the action of the Frobenius endomorphism π on the ℓ-torsion C[ℓ]
(viewed as an Fℓ-vector space of dimension 2).
More precisely, since
(
D
ℓ
)
= 1, the characteristic polynomial X2− tX + q of the Frobenius
π has two distinct roots µ 6= µ¯ modulo ℓ, and we can then write the ideals l, l¯ as (ℓ, π−µ) and
(ℓ, π − µ¯) respectively (up to reordering). If we view C[ℓ] as an Fℓ-vector space of dimension
2, the two kernels C[l] and C [¯l] will be vector subspaces given by
C[l] = C[ℓ] ∩Ker(π − µ) and C [¯l] = C[ℓ] ∩Ker(π − µ¯)
respectively, according to their generators above. In other words, these are the eigenspaces
of the Frobenius on C[ℓ], and π acts by multiplication by µ on C[l] (resp. µ¯ on C [¯l]).
Random sampling in Cl(O). We have just seen that we can efficiently compute l ∗C for any
prime ideal l of O over a split rational prime ℓ = polylog(q). We now argue that those prime
ideals are in fact sufficient to sample from a distribution close to the uniform distribution in
Cl(O).
This results from a theorem of Jao, Miller and Venkatesan [JMV09, Th. 1.1] essentially
saying that the Cayley graph of Cl(O) obtained using the classes of the ideals l associated to all
split rational primes ℓ ≤ x with x = logB |D| is an expander graph for any B > 2. Moreover,
there is an explicit bound on the spectral gap; namely, if we denote by λtriv ∼ 2x log x the
largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix, then all other eigenvalues λ satisfy
|λ| = O((λtriv log λtriv)1/2+1/B).
If we take B = 2+ ε, this implies that, for a suitable absolute constant C, a random walk of
length
(3) r ≥ C · δ + log h(D)
ε · log log |D|
in the graph yields a distribution that is exp(−δ)-statistically close to uniform.
Therefore, if we denote by S the set of ideals l associated to all split rational primes ℓ ≤ x
as above, and we choose r elements l1, . . . , lr in S at random with r as in (3), then the class
of the ideal a = l1 · · · lr is close to uniformly distributed in Cl(O).
We can then compute the elliptic curve a ∗ E as lr ∗
(
lr−1 ∗
( · · · ∗ (l1 ∗ E))), and its
isomorphism class is close to uniformly distributed in the isogeny class Ell(O) of E.
A.4. A low-brow approach to the classification result. In Appendix A.2 above, we
recalled results of Serre and Steinitz that are sufficient to establish the following properties,
used in the main construction of Section 4. Suppose that E is such that O = Z[π] is integrally
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closed, and let a1, . . . , an, a
′
1, . . . , a
′
n be ideals of O. Then, the following abelian varieties are
isomorphic:
(4) (a1 ∗ E)× · · · × (an ∗E) ∼= (a1 · · · an) ∗E × En−1.
and more generally, we have
(a1 ∗ E)× · · · × (an ∗E) ∼= (a′1 ∗ E)× · · · × (a′n ∗E) if and only if
a1 · · · an = a′1 · · · a′n as ideal classes in Cl(O).
(5)
As a side note, we now mention that those properties can in part be established using ele-
mentary techniques. More precisely, (4) is a consequence of the following elementary result.
Theorem A.1. Let E be an elliptic curve over a finite field Fq, and K a finite e´tale subgroup
of E (i.e., the map E → E/K is separable) defined over Fq. Suppose that K contains
subgroups Ki defined over Fq, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, whose orders are pairwise coprime, and suppose
K = K1 + · · ·+Kn. Then:
(E/K1)× · · · × (E/Kn) ∼= (E/K)× En−1.
Proof. The result is immediate for n = 1. We next prove the result for n = 2 by constructing
an explicit isomorphism. Consider the commutative diagram:
E
ϕ1
//
ϕ2

θ
$$❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
E/K1
ψ1

E/K2
ψ2
// E/K
where all maps are the natural quotient isogenies. If we denote by m1 and m2 the orders of
K1 and K2, we have degϕ1 = degψ2 = m1 and degϕ2 = degψ1 = m2. Now choose integers
a, b ∈ Z such that am1 + bm2 = 1. We define morphisms
f : E × (E/K)→ (E/K1)× (E/K2) and g : (E/K1)× (E/K2)→ E × (E/K)
by the following matrices:
Mat(f) =
(
ϕ1 ψ̂1
−bϕ2 aψ̂2
)
and Mat(g) =
(
aϕ̂1 −ϕ̂2
bψ1 ψ2
)
.
Then:
Mat(g ◦ f) =
(
aϕ̂1 −ϕ̂2
bψ1 ψ2
)(
ϕ1 ψ̂1
−bϕ2 aψ̂2
)
=
(
aϕ̂1ϕ1 + bϕ̂2ϕ2 aϕ̂1ψ̂1 − aϕ̂2ψ̂2
bψ1ϕ1 − bψ2ϕ2 bψ1ψ̂1 + aψ2ψ̂2
)
=
(
a[m1] + b[m2] (a− a)θ̂
(b− b)θ b[m2] + a[m1]
)
=
(
1 0
0 1
)
.
Thus, g◦f is the identity on E×(E/K), and similarly f◦g is the identity on (E/K1)×(E/K2).
So f and g are mutually inverse isomorphisms, proving the case n = 2.
We now proceed by induction. Suppose the desired result holds for some n, and suppose
K can be written as K = K1 + · · · + Kn+1 with the Ki’s of pairwise coprime order. Let
H = K1 + · · ·+Kn. The induction hypothesis implies
(6) (E/K1)× · · · × (E/Kn) ∼= (E/H) × En−1.
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On the other hand, K = H +Kn+1 and the subgroups H and Kn+1 have coprime order, so
by the n = 2 case above:
(7) (E/H) × (E/Kn+1) ∼= (E/K)× E.
Combining (6) and (7) gives:
(E/K1)× · · · × (E/Kn)× (E/Kn+1) ∼= ((E/H) × En−1)× (E/Kn+1)
∼= ((E/H) × (E/Kn+1))× En−1 ∼= (E/K) × En
which completes the induction. 
Applying Theorem A.1 to Ki = E[ai], we obtain (4) in the special case when the Ki’s have
pairwise coprime orders, i.e., when the ideals ai have pairwise coprime norms. The general
case follows by observing that for any choice of the ai’s, one can find ideals bi with pairwise
coprime norms such that bi is in the same ideal class as ai (just let b1 = a1, and construct
bi+1 as an ideal in the class of ai+1 coprime to N(a1 · · · ai) · O).
As a result, the “if” part of property (5) also follows. Indeed, by (4),
(a1 ∗ E)× · · · × (an ∗ E) ∼= (a1 · · · an) ∗ E × En−1
and
(a′1 ∗ E)× · · · × (a′n ∗E) ∼= (a′1 · · · a′n) ∗E × En−1.
If the ideal classes of a1 · · · an and a′1 · · · a′n are equal in Cl(O), then
(a1 ∗ E)× · · · × (an ∗ E) ∼= (a′1 ∗ E)× · · · × (a′n ∗E)
as desired.
However, the converse (the “only if” part of property (5)) is more difficult, and essentially
states that for E′ and E′′ isogenous to E, if E′ × En−1 ∼= E′′ × En−1 then E′ ∼= E′′. Such
a cancellation result does not hold for a supersingular E, so the proof in the ordinary case
has to rely on the structure of the endomorphism ring in a crucial way. See [Shi77] for an
illuminating discussion, particularly Section 4 for the n = 2 case.
Appendix B. Mumford’s invariant
In this appendix we give details of the result on Mumford’s theta null invariants that was
discussed in Section 5.
B.1. Theta functions. We review what we need from Mumford’s theory of theta functions.
Let A be a g-dimensional abelian variety over an algebraically closed field k. In practice,
we need only work over a low degree extension of our base field. We will assume A comes
equipped with a principal polarization given by an invertible sheaf L0; the choice of such a
polarization will later be crucial for our analysis. Let L be an ample symmetric invertible
sheaf on A with char(k) ∤ degL. Going forwards, all sheaves will be of this form. Typically
we let L = Lm0 for some m not divisible by char(k).
For P ∈ A, write τP for the translation-by-P map. Let H(L) ⊂ A be the set of P for which
τ∗PL
∼= L. For convenience, we will assume H(L) = A[m] for some choice of m. Let G(L) be
the theta group of L, which consists of pairs (P,ψP ) where P ∈ H(L) and ψP : L → L is
an isomorphism that factors through τ∗PL; that is, there is some isomorphism ψ˜P : τ
∗
PL→ L
such that ψP = ψ˜P ◦ τ∗P . The group operation is
(P,ψP )(Q,ψQ) = (P +Q,ψP ◦ ψQ),
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which one checks is well-defined. The theta group lies in an exact sequence
(8) 0 −→ k∗ −→ G(L) −→ H(L) −→ 0
where the image of α ∈ k∗ is (O,α), and the map G(L) → H(L) is (P,ψP ) 7→ P . Let
V = Γ(A,L). Then G(L) has a natural action on V .
Let δ be the g-tuple (m,m, . . . ,m); we call δ the level or type of L. Let K1 = (Z/mZ)
g,
let K2 = Hom(K1, k
∗), and let H(δ) = K1 ×K2. Write 〈x, y〉 for the evaluation pairing on
H(δ), which we extend to a symplectic form by letting K1 × {0} and {0} ×K2 be isotropic
subspaces. Let G(δ), the abstract theta group of level δ, be the set k∗ × H(δ) with group
operation
(a, x, y) · (b, x′, y′) = (〈x, y′〉 ab, x+ x′, y + y′).
Then G(δ) lies in the exact sequence
0 −→ k∗ −→ G(δ) −→ H(δ) −→ 0.
Let V (δ) be the k-vector space of maps from K1 to k. Then G(δ) acts on V (δ) via
(a, x, y)(f)(z) = a 〈z, y〉 f(x+ z).
A level δ theta structure for A is a choice of L as above as well as a choice of isomorphism
α : G(δ) → G(L) that is the identity on k∗. Mumford [Mum66, p. 298] shows that α induces
an isomorphism β : V (δ) → V , unique up to a scalar, that respects α. That is, for all
g ∈ G(δ) and f ∈ V (δ), we have β(gf) = α(g)β(f). Let x0, . . . , xN be a fixed ordering of the
elements of K1, and let fi be the delta function at xi; that is, fi(xi) = 1 and fi(xj) = 0 for
i 6= j. The fi then furnish a canonical basis for V (δ). Let θi = β(fi). Define φ : A −→ PN
by φ(P ) = [θ0(P ) : · · · : θN (P )]. Then φ(O) is the theta null associated to α. Thus, a
choice of theta structure gives rise to a point φ(O) in projective space.
B.2. Properties of theta structures.
Proposition B.1. Given a theta structure α : G(δ) → G(L), if 4 | δ, then the associated
map φ : A → PN is an embedding. Furthermore, φ(A) is determined by the theta null φ(O)
associated to α.
Since for us, δ = (m,m, . . . ,m), 4 | δ means 4 | m. The above proposition is the Corollary
on p. 349 of [Mum66]. The equations defining φ(A) are usually called the Riemann equations.
As a consequence, we see that the theta null associated to a theta structure of type δ, with
4 | δ, is a nondegenerate invariant; that is, with δ chosen beforehand, nonisomorphic abelian
varieties cannot have the same theta null.
Lemma B.2. Let α : G(δ)→ G(L) be a theta structure. Then the induced map H(δ)→ H(L)
is a symplectic isomorphism, where the pairing on H(L) is the Weil pairing.
Proof. See p. 317 of [Mum66]. 
Lemma B.3. Suppose H(L) = A[m]. Given a symplectic isomorphism h : H(δ) → H(L),
there are exactly m2g theta structures α that induce h.
Proof. Let x1, . . . , xg, y1, . . . , yg be a symplectic basis for H(δ). Let Pi = h(xi) and Qi =
h(yi). We have that G(δ) is generated by k
∗ and the elements (1, xi, 0) and (1, 0, yi). Each of
these elements has order m in G(δ). Let α : G(δ) → G(L) be an isomorphism that induces h.
Then α((1, xi, 0)) = (Pi, ψPi) and α((1, 0, yi)) = (Qi, ψQi) for appropriate choices of ψPi and
ψQi ; in particular, each of these maps V → V must have order dividing m. From the exact
sequence (8), we see that for fixed i, any two choices of ψPi (resp. ψQi) differ by a nonzero
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scalar. But such a scalar must be an mth root of unity so that ψPi (resp. ψQi) has order m.
Thus, for each Pi, there are at most m choices of ψPi , and similarly for the Qi. Since the
choices of α((1, xi, 0)) and α((1, 0, yi)) completely determine α, the claim follows. 
Lemma B.4. Let A1, A2 be abelian varieties and L1, L2 ample invertible sheaves on A1, A2,
respectively. For i = 1, 2 let pi : A1 ×A2 → Ai be the projection maps. Then
G(p∗1L1 ⊗ p∗2L2) = (G(L1)×G(L2))/{(a, a−1)|a ∈ k∗}.
Proof. This is Lemma 1 on p. 323 of [Mum66]. 
We will write the right-hand group above as G(L1)×k∗ G(L2); if we think of the relevant
groups as group schemes, then we do in fact get the fiber product.
Observe that if δ1, δ2 are the types of L1, L2, respectively, then δ = (δ1, δ2) is the type of
p∗1L1⊗ p∗2L2 and G(δ) = G(δ1)×k∗ G(δ2). It follows that if αi is a theta structure for the pair
(Ai, Li), then we have a product theta structure α : G(δ)→ G(L).
Proposition B.5. Let A1 and A2 be abelian varieties, let L1 and L2 be ample invertible
sheaves on A1 and A2 of types δ1 and δ2, respectively, and let L = p
∗
1L1⊗ p∗2L2, an invertible
sheaf on A = A1×A2. Let α1 and α2 be theta structures for (A1, L1) and (A2, L2), respectively,
and let α be the product theta structure for (A,L). For the theta structure αi, let φi : Ai → PNi
be the associated morphism, and similarly define φ : A→ PN . Then, up to possible reordering
of coordinates, φ = s ◦ (φ1, φ2), where (φ1, φ2) : A1×A2 → PN1 ×PN2 and s is the Segre map
PN1 × PN2 → PN .
Proof. We first check that the Segre map makes sense; that is, that
N = (N1 + 1)(N2 + 1)− 1.
Setting Vi = Γ(Ai, Li) and V = Γ(A,L), we have dimVi = Ni + 1, dimV = N + 1, but also
V = V1 ⊗ V2. Observe that similarly, V (δ) = V (δ1)⊗ V (δ2). Therefore the dimension counts
are compatible.
By our isomorphisms G(δ) ∼= G(δ1)×k∗ G(δ2) and G(L) ∼= G(L1) ×k∗ G(L2) and the fact
that α is obtained as
(α1, α2) : G(δ1)×k∗ G(δ2) −→ G(L1)×k∗ G(L2),
one sees that the induced isomorphism β : V (δ)→ V can instead be written
(β1, β2) : V (δ1)⊗ V (δ2) −→ V1 ⊗ V2
where the βi are the isomorphisms induced by the αi. Let f0, . . . , fN1 be the standard
basis for V (δ1), and g0, . . . , gN2 the standard basis for V (δ2). Then fi ⊗ gj is a basis for
V (δ) = V (δ1)⊗ V (δ2), and one sees that it will be a permutation of the standard basis. Let
us assume that the standard ordering is given by
f0 ⊗ g0, f1 ⊗ g0, . . . , f0 ⊗ g1, f1 ⊗ g1, . . . .
Let ri = β1(fi) and sj = β2(gj). Then for P = (P1, P2) ∈ A1 ×A2,
φ1(P1) = [r0(P1) : · · · : rN1(P1)],
φ2(P2) = [s0(P2) : · · · : sN2(P2)], and
φ(P ) = [(r0s0)(P ) : (r1s0)(P ) : · · · : (rN1sN2)(P )]
= [r0(P1)s0(P2) : · · · : rN1(P1)sN2(P2)].
Then visibly s(φ1(P1), φ2(P2)) = φ(P ). The claim follows. 
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Observe that under the hypotheses of the proposition, if φ is an embedding, then φ(A) is
simply the Segre embedding applied to the product embedding
φ1(A1)× φ2(A2) ⊂ PN1 × PN2 .
B.3. Mumford’s theta null invariant. Fix n ∈ Z>0 and mutually isogenous elliptic curves
E1, . . . , En. Let
A = E1 × E2 × · · · × En
with its product polarization, i.e., the principal polarization with divisor
(9) D = ({O} × E2 × · · · × En) + (E1 × {O} × E3 × · · · × En) + · · ·+ (E1 × · · · × {O}).
Fixm ≥ 2 and let L be the invertible sheaf associated to the divisormD, so thatH(L) = A[m]
and δ = (m,m, . . . ,m). Loop over every theta structure for L and, for each one, compute
the associated theta null. We define
Mumfm(E1, . . . , En)
to be the resulting set of theta nulls.
Proposition B.6. For fixed m and n, we have
#Mumfm(E1, . . . , En) ≤ m2n ·#Sp2n(Z/mZ).
Proof. To choose a theta structure, we first choose a symplectic isomorphism h : H(δ) →
H(L). The number of such isomorphisms is the size of Sp2n(Z/mZ), the group of 2n × 2n
symplectic matrices with entries in Z/mZ. For each symplectic isomorphism h, by Lemma
B.3 there are m2n theta structures lying above it. The claim now follows. 
Proposition B.7. Let E1 and E2 be isogenous ordinary elliptic curves over Fq with complex
multiplication by Q(
√−d) with d square-free. Let h(d) be the class number of Q(√−d).
Suppose 4 | m ∈ Z>0 and h(d) > m4#Sp2n(Z/mZ). Then there exist E3 and E4 isogenous
to E1 such that E1 × E2 ∼= E3 × E4 but Mumfm(E1, E2) 6= Mumfm(E3, E4).
Proof. Let A = E1×E2. Let P be the set of pairs of elliptic curves (E3, E4) isogenous to E1
for which A ∼= E3 × E4. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that M := Mumfm(E1, E2) =
Mumfm(E3, E4) for all (E3, E4) ∈ P . Construct a map F : P → M as follows. Given
(E3, E4) ∈ P , define the invertible sheaves L3 = L(mO) on E3, L4 = L(mO) on E4, and
L = p∗3L3⊗p∗4L4 on E3×E4, where the pi are the obvious projections. Let δ = (m,m). Then
our theta nulls for E3×E4 are computed using theta structures of the form α : G(δ) → G(L).
Choose a product theta structure α0. Then define F (E3, E4) to be the theta null associated
to α0.
We claim that F is injective. For given a theta null in the image of F , it comes from a
product theta structure for some (E′, E′′) ∈ P . Since 4 | m, by the second part of Proposition
B.1 the associated embedding φ(A) is determined by the theta null φ(O). By Proposition
B.5, we have φ(A) = s(φ1(E
′), φ2(E
′′)), where s is the Segre map. As φ is an embedding (by
Proposition B.1), the φi must also be embeddings. Therefore we can recover the pair (E
′, E′′)
from the theta null. This gives a map im(F ) → P which is a left inverse to F , which shows
that F is injective.
Let O = End(E1). The map Cl(O) → P given by [a] 7→ (a ∗ E1, a−1 ∗ E2) is injective, so
#P ≥ h(d). By Proposition B.6 and our assumption on m we have
#M ≤ m4#Sp4(Z/mZ) < h(d) ≤ #P,
contradicting the injectivity of F . The claim follows. 
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As stated in Appendix A.3, assuming the Generalized Riemann Hypothesis, the class
number h(d) is roughly of size
√
q as q → ∞. Thus the inequality h(d) > m4#Sp2n(Z/mZ)
in the statement of Proposition B.7 holds for typical use-cases.
